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CIVIL EVIDENCE
Elizabeth D. Whitaker*
Amy K. Hunt**

A

was the case last year, the most significant activity in the evi-

dence field has been in the areas of expert testimony and privileges. Both the United States Supreme Court and the Texas
Supreme Court issued opinions further clarifying the landmark cases
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.' and E. I. Du Pont de
2
Nemours and Co., Inc. v. Robinson.
Also significant in Texas state practice was the unification of the civil
and criminal rules of evidence. Most of the changes necessary to unify
Rules were minor; however, there are a few significant changes to note
relating to the attorney-client privilege and inferences that can be drawn
from the assertion of a privilege.
Finally, as always, there are a few cases of note dealing with unique
circumstances or rarely applied rules of evidence.
While we make no claim that this Article encompasses every development of the past year, we hope that it will give the reader an idea of some
of the significant developments in the area of civil evidence.
I.

ADMISSIBILITY OF EXPERT TESTIMONY

A.

DAUBERT AND DUPONT

In 1993, the United States Supreme Court decided Daubert v. Merrell
Dow Pharmaceuticals,Inc.,3 holding that under Rule 702 of the Federal
Rules of Evidence, scientific evidence is not admissible unless it is "scientifically valid" and reliable. 4 The Daubert Court rejected the long followed rule set out in Frye v. United States,5 which held scientific evidence
* Elizabeth D. Whitaker is a partner with the law firm of Carrington, Coleman,
Sloman & Blumenthal L.L.P. She specializes in complex commercial litigation. She attended Southern Methodist University School of Law, graduating in 1980, with honors.
She served as Notes and Comments Editor of the Southwestern Law Journal, 1979-80. Ms.
Whitaker was recently elected to become a member of the American Law Institute.
** Amy K. Hunt is an associate with the law firm of Carrington, Coleman, Sloman &
Blumenthal L.L.P. She specializes in complex commercial litigation. She attended Southern Methodist University School of Law, graduating in 1994, summa cum laude. Following
graduation, Ms. Hunt clerked for the Honorable Patrick E. Higginbotham, United States
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.
1.509 U.S. 579 (1993).
2. 923 S.W.2d 549 (Tex. 1995).
3. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
4. Id. at 597.
5. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
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admissible when the offering party established that the technique or principle had "gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it
belongs."'6 Instead, the Court adopted a "flexible" 7 analysis, which included consideration of the following factors in determining "whether a
theory or technique is scientific knowledge that will assist the trier of
fact":"
(1) whether it can be (and has been) tested; 9
(2) whether the theory or technique has been subjected to peer review and publication;' 0
(3) in the case of a particular scientific technique, the known or potential rate of error;1"2 and
(4) general acceptance.'
Because the federal and state rules governing the admissibility of expert testimony are identically worded, 13 it was not long before the Texas
Supreme Court was faced with the same issue. In E. I. Du Pont de
Nemours and Co., Inc. v. Robinson,14 the court followed Daubert's footsteps, holding that Rule 702 "requires the proponent to show that the
expert's testimony is relevant to the issues in the case and is based upon a
reliable foundation."' 5 In determining the reliability of scientific evidence, the court set out a list of non-exclusive factors it considered relevant to the inquiry:
(1) the extent to which the theory has been or can be tested;
(2) the extent to which the technique relies upon the subjective interpretation of the expert;
(3) whether the theory has been subjected to peer review or
publication;
(4) the technique's potential rate of error;
(5) whether the underlying theory or technique has been generally
accepted as valid by the relevant scientific community; and
(6) the non-judicial uses which have been made of the theory or
technique. 16
Last year, both the state and federal courts decided cases further refining and clarifying these rules.
6. Id. at 1014.
7. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 594.
8. Id. at 593.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 594.
12. Id.
13. Compare FED. R. EvID. 702 with TEX. R. EVID. 702. Both rules state the
following:
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of
fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness
qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education,
may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise.
14. 923 S.W.2d 549 (Tex. 1995).
15. Id. at 556.
16. Id. at 557 (citation and footnote omitted).
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B.

THE FEDERAL DECISIONS

In General Electric Co. v. Joiner,17 the Supreme Court considered the
standards under which appellate courts should review a decision by the
trial court to exclude expert testimony. Both sides conceded that the
standard was abuse of discretion; however, the controversy centered
around whether the Eleventh Circuit had applied too narrow an abuse of
18
discretion standard.
Robert Joiner, an electrician in the Water & Light Department of
Thomasville, Georgia, was exposed regularly to dielectric fluid that was
later found to be contaminated with PCBs, a known hazard to human
health. When Joiner, who was a smoker and had a family history of lung
cancer, was diagnosed in 1991 with small cell lung cancer, he sued General Electric and Westinghouse Electric (collectively "GE"), among
others, claiming that as manufacturers of the dielectric fluid they were
liable because the fluid "promoted" his cancer. 19 The trial court granted
GE's motion for summary judgment in part on the grounds that Joiner's
experts had failed to show a link between exposure to PCBs and small
cell lung cancer.
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit reversed. It held that "because the
Federal Rules of Evidence governing expert testimony display a preference for admissibility, we apply a particularly stringent standard of review
to the trial judge's exclusion of expert testimony. '20 Applying that standard, the appeals court concluded that the trial court had impermissibly
substituted its opinion for that of the expert.
The Supreme Court reversed. It first rejected the notion that there
should be any difference in the standard of review applicable to a decision to exclude an expert's testimony and the standard applicable to a
decision to admit an expert's testimony. 21 It then concluded that the
court of appeals had failed to give the requisite deference to the trial
22
court's decision excluding the evidence.
Joiner's experts testified that it was "more likely than not" that Joiner's
lung cancer was linked to smoking and PCB exposure. 23 The trial court,
however, held that the facts did not support this conclusion. First, the
court found that Joiner's experts could not explain how the results of
animal studies, in which infant mice were injected with massive doses of
PCBs, could be extrapolated to humans. In the other four epidemiological studies upon which Joiner's experts relied, the authors were either
unwilling to conclude there was a link between the cancer and PCB exposure or the studies themselves involved substances other than PCBs.
17. 118 S. Ct. 512 (1997).
18. See id. at 515, 517.

19. Id. at 516.
20. Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

21. See id. at 517.
22. See id.
23. Id. at 518.
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The Supreme Court held:
Trained experts commonly extrapolate from existing data[,] ... nothing in either Daubert or the Federal Rules of Evidence requires a
district court to admit opinion evidence which is connected to existing data only by the ipse dixit [i.e., bare assertion] of the expert. A
court may conclude that there is simply too 24
great an analytical gap
between the data and the opinion proffered.
Discovering this "analytical gap" between an expert's conclusions and
the underlying data has been the focus of a number of decisions in the
lower state and federal courts following Joiner. In Moore v. Ashland
Chemical Inc. ,25 the Fifth Circuit held the district court did not abuse its
discretion in excluding Moore's proffered expert. Moore was exposed to
a mixture of chemicals that had leaked from sealed drums carried inside
his truck. Soon after exposure, Moore began to suffer from a condition
known as "reactive airways dysfunction syndrome. '26 At issue was
whether this respiratory ailment was caused by exposure to those chemicals. At trial, Moore offered the testimony of two clinical physicians, Drs.
Jenkins and Alvarez, who had examined and treated him. The trial court
excluded the testimony by Dr. Jenkins that exposure to the chemicals had
caused Moore's illness, but allowed the substantially similar testimony of
Dr. Alvarez. The jury returned a verdict against Moore, finding that the
defendants' conduct did not cause his illness. On appeal, the defendants
did not challenge the district court's decision to admit Dr. Alvarez's opinion, so the only issue presented was whether the court's failure to admit
27
Dr. Jenkins' testimony was an abuse of discretion.
Judge Davis, writing for the en banc majority, concluded that Dr. Jenkins had failed to causally link his conclusion with the facts offered in
support. For instance, his training and experience and his examination of
Moore and evaluation of Moore's test results, while important to his diagnosis, gave no indication on their face as to how they were helpful in
reaching his conclusion that exposure to the chemicals caused the ailment. 28 In addition, the article Dr. Jenkins relied on contained speculative conclusions and involved a level and duration of exposure that was
several times greater than that experienced by Moore. 2 9 The court of
appeals also found that the district court did not abuse its discretion when
it concluded that the material safety data sheet (MSDS) was of limited
value to Dr. Jenkins because he did not know what tests had been conducted in generating the MSDS and had no information on the level of
exposure necessary to sustain the injuries about which the MSDS
warned. 30
24. Id. at 519.
25. 151 F.3d 269,279 (5th Cir. 1998) (en banc), petition for cert. filed, 67 U.S.L.W. 3409
(U.S. Dec. 17, 1998) (No. 98-992).
26. See id. at 272.
27. See id. at 273.
28. See id. at 277-78.
29. See id. at 278.

30. See id.
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The court also rejected Dr. Jenkins' attempt to extrapolate causation
based on the temporal proximity between the exposure and the injury.31
"In the absence of an established scientific connection between exposure
and illness, or compelling circumstance . . ., the temporal connection between exposure chemicals and an onset of symptoms, standing alone, is
entitled to little weight in determining causation. '32 Not only did Dr.
Jenkins not have accurate information about the level of Moore's exposure to the fumes, he could not articulate a scientific connection between
33
the time of exposure and onset of symptoms.
Finally, the court rejected Dr. Jenkins' fall-back position that any irritant to the lungs could cause the respiratory ailment in a susceptible patient. The court found that none of the Daubert factors had been met:
"Dr. Jenkins theory had not been tested; the theory had not been subjected to peer review or publication; the potential rate of error had not
been determined or applied; and the theory had not been generally ac'34
cepted in the scientific community.
C.

THE STATE DECISIONS

The Texas courts of appeals have also rejected experts whose conclusions are not supported by valid scientific knowledge and data. In Mitchell Electric Corp. v. Bartlett,35 for instance, the plaintiff landowners relied
on the testimony of two experts-a geochemist and a petroleum engineer-to prove that hydrogen sulfide from the defendant's wells migrated
to their water and caused their injuries. The petroleum engineer provided no evidence of causation because he did not testify that gas from
the well was found in any of the plaintiffs' water.3 6 The geochemist's testimony was similarly unhelpful because his testimony consisted of using
unsupported "magic" phrases such as "reasonable degree of certainty"
and "certainly could have come. '3 7 The court concluded that "[u]nless
the expert provides supporting facts, his bare conclusion is not
38
evidence."
Another case in which the bare conclusion of an expert was rejected is
Minnesota Mining & Manufacturing Co. v. Atterbury.39 In that case, the
issue was whether users of silicone gel breast implants presented sufficient reliable evidence to support the jury's conclusion that the implants
caused their illnesses. The court concluded that the opinions of the plaintiffs' three experts were unreliable and should have been excluded. 40
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

See id.
Id. at 278 (citations omitted).
See id. at 278-79.
Id. at 279.
958 S.W.2d 430 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1997, pet. denied).
See id. at 446.
Id. at 447.
Id.
978 S.W.2d 183 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1998, pet. denied).
See id. at 196-203.

SMU LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 52

After exhaustively reviewing the precedent concerning expert witness
testimony and the precedent on expert witness testimony in silicone
cases, the court evaluated the plaintiffs' experts. All three experts had
testified that based upon a reasonable medical probability, the breast implants more likely than not caused the injuries. The Texarkana court,
however, found the analytical gap between this conclusion and the facts
and data underlying it too wide to warrant admitting the testimony.
The first step the court took in analyzing the evidence was to identify
"the types of evidence necessary in a legal and factual sufficiency of the
evidence review to support a finding of causation in toxic tort cases." 4
The court held that reliable epidemiological evidence along with other
evidence that links the plaintiffs to the population in the study and eliminates other possible causes of the plaintiffs' injuries are necessary, but not
sufficient: 42 "[O]ne reliable epidemiological study that has a statistically
significant association will not be enough to satisfy a legal insufficiency
review."'4 3 The proponent of the epidemiological study must also produce another study to verify the results of the study being offered.44
Moreover, the court expressed the view that the Texas Supreme Court
"places the ... factor of peer-reviewed publication at a higher level than
45
does the United States Supreme Court.
Since the plaintiff was unable to obtain reliable epidemiological evidence, the court identified, but rejected, alternative methods of proving
causation. "Abstracts that reanalyze other epidemiological evidence and
that do not state the methodologies used, specifically the significance
level, the confidence level, and the choice of the control group, will not
be considered." '4 6 The court also held that animal studies, standing alone,
were unlikely to constitute sufficient evidence of causation. 47 In addition,
"isolated case reports, random experience, and reports lacking the details
which permit scientific evaluation will not be considered. '48 Finally, differential studies-that is, diagnosing illness through the elimination of
other causes-is "most likely ... not sufficient under current standards
promulgated by the Texas Supreme Court.. . based upon what appears
objective evidence and its disdain for
to be the court's total reliance on
49
any form of subjective analysis."
The court went through the testimony of each of the plaintiffs' experts
and found them all wanting. Two of the experts had used abstracts that
had not been published or subjected to peer review. 50 One of the experts
relied on two epidemiological studies, but did not articulate the studies'
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

Id. at 198.
See id.
Id.
See id.
Id.
Id. at 199.
See id.
Id. (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
Id.
See id. at 200-01.
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methodologies or their error rates.5 1 The court rejected the testimony of
the plaintiffs' third expert on the grounds that while his diagnostic methodologies were based on generally accepted medical practice, those practices were based on subjective analysis. Moreover, there was "no
generally accepted criteria by which doctors can link injuries and illnesses
52
to implants.
In sum, the court held that the plaintiffs had the burden to prove "that
the agent he or she alleges caused injury or illness (1) could do so in the
general population, and (2) did so to him or her specifically." '53 The
plaintiffs did not meet their burden as to the first, and the court reversed
the jury verdict.
In addition to the analytical gap issues raised by the expert testimony
precedent, another issue that arises is whether the Daubert/Robinsonfactors apply to all expert testimony or only scientific expert testimony or
even novel scientific expert testimony. Last year, the Fifth Circuit resolved the issue in Watkins v. Telsmith, Inc.,54 holding that the Daubert
factors are relevant to evaluating the admissibility of any expert testimony under Rule 702.55 This year, the Texas Supreme Court addressed
the issue in Gammill v. Jack Williams Chevrolet, Inc..56 The Texas
Supreme Court, like the Fifth Circuit, concluded that Robinson applied to
all expert testimony. 57 The court, however, made clear that even though
expert testimony must be reliable and relevant, "considerations listed in
Daubert and Robinson for assessing the reliability of scientific evidence
cannot always be used with other kinds of expert testimony. '58 Nonetheless, the court must discharge its gatekeeper duty in evaluating the reliability of the evidence proffered by the expert and not leave the matter
solely to the jury and opposing counsel's ability to effectively cross-ex59
amine the witness.
Although relevance and reliability are issues considered only after an
expert is determined to be qualified, the issue of expert qualification does
sometimes arise. In Hall v. Huff,60 the Texarkana Court of Appeals decided an interesting case involving a claim that an expert's qualifications
51. See id. at 200.
52. Id. at 202.
53. Id. at 203.
54. 121 F.3d 984 (5th Cir. 1997).
55. See id. at 991. The extent to which a trial court performs the gatekeeper function
when the expert testimony offered is non-scientific is a matter that will soon be decided by
the Supreme Court when it hears Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 66 U.S.L.W. 3793 (No.
97-1709). That case, on appeal from the Eleventh Circuit, will review the conclusion that
"[ejxpert testimony that implicates scientific principles but that is based on expert's experience and observations need not be subject to four-part analysis outline in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc. for admission of scientific evidence." Id. (citation omitted). The
issue presented is: "May trial judge consider four factors set out in Daubert ...in FED. R.

EvID. 702 analysis of admissibility of engineering expert's testimony?" Id.
56. 972 S.W.2d 713 (Tex. 1998).
57. See id. at 726.
58. Id.
59. See id. at 728.
60. 957 S.W.2d 90 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1997, pet. denied).
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were defeated by application of the locality rule. Beth Ann Hall, on behalf of the estate of her husband, Arthur Hall filed suit against William K.
Huff, M.D. and Good Shepard Hospital, Inc. (GSH), alleging that their
malpractice caused the death of her husband. The trial court granted the
defendants' motions for summary judgment. As to GSH, the trial court
struck the testimony of Hrehorovich, the only expert Hall offered against
GSH, after GSH argued he was not qualified to render an opinion concerning nursing standards of care.
The court of appeals reviewed the trial court's decision for abuse of
discretion. 61 GSH claimed the trial court did not abuse its discretion because Hrehorovich was unfamiliar with the standards of care in Texas.
The court, however, disagreed. It pointed out that "Hrehorovich stated
by affidavit that he was familiar with the standard of care for appropriate
catheter placement and diagnosis and emergency treatment of cardiac
tamponade that exist under same or similar circumstances. '62 Finding
"no evidence that nursing standards of care in Texas greatly differ from or
are inferior to national standards," 63 the court held Hrehorovich qualified
and his testimony admissible. The court disavowed a complete abrogation of the locality rule, but held that is was best served by the use of
"same or similar circumstances" language. 64
Another case from the El Paso Court of Appeals reveals an anomaly in
the law qualifying certain individuals to testify as to the reasonableness
and necessity of medical bills. In Castillo v. American Garment Finishers
Corp.,6 5 Castillo sued his former employer, American Garment, for injuries he sustained as a result of inhalation of chemical fumes at work. At
trial, Castillo attempted to substantiate the reasonableness and necessity
of his medical bills with the live testimony of the custodian of records.
The court excluded the testimony.
On appeal, the Castillo argued the custodian's testimony was admissible under sections 18.001 and 18.002 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code, which permit a non-expert custodian of records to testify via
affidavit that medical bills are reasonable and necessary. The court rejected this argument, finding the statute to be a limited exception to rule
that "expert testimony is required to establish that medical expenses are
'66
reasonable and necessary."
The last case of note on the issue of experts reminds practitioners again
of the importance of preserving error. In Maritime Overseas Corp. v. Ellis,67 Ellis was exposed to Diazinon while serving on a ship owned by
Maritime. At trial, Ellis' experts testified that the exposure caused irre61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.

See id. at 99-100.
Id. at 101 (emphasis added).
Id.
Id.
965 S.W.2d 646 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1998, no pet.).
Id. at 654.
971 S.W.2d 402 (Tex. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 541 (1998).
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versible "delayed neurotoxicity" or "neuropathy. ' '68 Maritime did not
object at trial to the admission of the expert testimony, but rather complained on appeal that the scientific methodology was ill-founded, which
rendered the experts' testimony unreliable and no evidence of causation.
The Texas Supreme Court rejected Maritime's argument. The court
explained that the Daubert,Robinson, and Havner decisions emphasize
the trial court's role as gatekeeper and its function to make preliminary
determinations as to whether offered testimony meets the relevance and
reliability standards. 69 Thus, to preserve a complaint that expert testimony is unreliable and, therefore, no evidence, the party must object to
70
the evidence before trial or at the time the evidence is offered at trial.
This ensures the offering party an opportunity to cure any defect and prevents trial and appeal by ambush. 71 In addition, requiring the opposing
party to object promotes certainty and fairness and gives notice to both
the litigants and the courts as to what issues remain. 7 2 Finally, appellate
courts "must base their decisions on the record as made and brought forward, not on a record that should have been made or could have been
73
made."
II.

PRIVILEGES

On March 1, 1998, the new Texas Rules of Evidence became effective,
consolidating what had previously been separate rules for civil and criminal cases. 74 Although most of the changes in the rules are minor, one of

the more significant changes involves the law of attorney/client privilege.
The new evidence rules reject the "control group test" for corporate clients set forth in National Tank Co. v. Brotherton,75 and instead adopt the
more commonly accepted "subject matter test."'76 A communication is
now protected if made to a representative of a client, which includes
"any ...person who, for the purpose of effectuating legal representation
for the client, makes or receives a confidential communication
while act'77
ing in the scope of employment for the client.
One other change, though not as significant, deals with the inferences
that may be drawn by a jury upon the invocation of a privilege. Rule
513(d) now permits, upon request, an instruction to the jury that no adverse inference may be drawn from the assertion of a privilege in a civil
case. 78 This rule, however, still does not apply to a party's claim of the
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
States,
77.
78.

Id. at 405.
See id. at 409.
See id. at 411.
See id. at 409.
See id. at 411.
Id.
See TEX. R. OF

EvID., 61 TEX. B.J. 374 (1998).
851 S.W.2d 193 (Tex. 1993).
See TEX. R. EVID. 503 (comment to 1998 change); see also Upjohn Co. v. United
449 U.S. 383, 395 (1981) (articulating the subject matter test).
TEX. R. EviD. 503(a)(2)(B).
See id. 513(d).

SMU LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 52

privilege against self-incrimination.7'
The other cases of note concerning privileges arise in such varied contexts as attorney disqualification, joint venture disputes, and grievance
proceedings. In the decision of In re Meador,s° the issue was whether an
attorney was subject to disqualification where, through no wrongdoing of
the client, the attorney received an opponent's privileged materials.
Meador, a former consultant for Conley, Lott, Nichols Machinery Company (CLN), sued the company, alleging various employment-related
claims. Peterson, the assistant to CLN's president, came across privileged
documents relating to Meador's case. Peterson copied the documents
and later met with Meador's attorney, Masterson, to discuss whether she
should bring her own claim against CLN. During this meeting, Peterson
gave Masterson a copy of the privileged documents. CLN discovered
Masterson had obtained copies of the documents, and when Masterson
refused to return them, CLN moved to have him disqualified. The trial
court refused to disqualify Masterson but did order Masterson to return
all copies of the documents and prohibited him from using them in the
Meador litigation.
CLN petitioned for a writ of mandamus compelling Masterson's disqualification. The court of appeals granted relief, adopting the standard
of conduct set forth in an American Bar Association Formal Opinion:
A lawyer who receives on an unauthorized basis materials of an adverse party that she knows to be privileged or confidential should,
upon recognizing the privileged or confidential nature of the materials, either refrain from reviewing such materials or review them only
to the extent required to determine how appropriately to proceed;
she should notify her adversary's lawyer that she has such materials
and should either follow instructions of the adversary's lawyer with
respect to the disposition of the materials, or refrain from using the
materials until a definitive resolution of the proper disposition of the
materials is obtained from a court."'
On petition for relief from that decision, the Texas Supreme Court disagreed with the court of appeals and declined to hold that the trial court
82
had abused its discretion in refusing to disqualify Masterson.
The court held that the absence of a Texas Rule of Disciplinary Procedure applicable to the situation did not resolve the issue. Because the
disciplinary rules are only guidelines, "a court has the power, under appropriate circumstances, to disqualify an attorney even though he or she
has not violated a specific disciplinary rule. '8 3 Under these circumstances, the court concluded the ABA's Formal Opinion "represent[ed]
the standard to which attorneys should aspire in dealing with an oppo79. See id. 513(c).
80. 968 S.W.2d 346 (Tex. 1998).
81. Id. at 349 (citing ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal

Op. 382 (1994)).
82. See Meador, 968 S.W.2d at 354.
83. Id. at 351.
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nent's privileged information. '" 84 In accordance with that Opinion, the
court held the trial court should consider the following factors in determining whether to exercise its discretion to disqualify counsel "when a
lawyer receives an opponent's privileged materials outside the normal
85
course of discovery:"
(1) whether the attorney knew or should have known that the material was privileged;
(2) the promptness with which the attorney notifies the opposing
side that he or she has received its privileged information;
(3) the extent to which the attorney reviews and digests the privileged information;
(4) the significance of the privileged information; i.e., the extent to
which its disclosure may prejudice the movant's claim or defense,
and the extent to which return of the documents will mitigate the
prejudice;
(5) the extent to which movant may be at fault for the unauthorized
disclosure;
(6) the extent to which the nonmovant will8 6suffer prejudice from the
disqualification of his or her attorney.
Applying these factors, the court determined the trial court did not
abuse its discretion in refusing to disqualify Masterson. There was no
evidence, the court held, that the information contained in the improperly disclosed documents would "significantly prejudice CLN's claims and
defenses. '87 In addition, the court found there was evidence that Meador
88
would suffer significant hardship if Masterson were disqualified.
Another decision out of the Houston Court of Appeals dealt with the
interrelationship between the joint client exception to the attorney/client
privilege and fiduciary duties joint venturers owe each other. In the decision of In re Valero,89 Valero Transmission, L.P. (Valero) filed a petition
for writ of mandamus against Teco Pipeline Company (Teco) after the
trial court ordered Valero to produce documents Valero alleged were
protected by the attorney-client privilege. Teco and Valero were joint
venturers in operating a gas pipeline. The "parties competed with each
other to secure customers for the transportation of gas," but "had to account to the joint venture for use of the pipeline by paying a tariff set by
the operating agreement." 90 In 1996, Teco sued Valero, claiming that
Valero had diverted opportunities and profits belonging to the joint venture. Teco propounded discovery that asked, in part, for documents prepared by Valero's in-house counsel. Teco claimed it was entitled to the
documents under the joint client exception because it was billed for the
84. Id.

85.
86.
87.
88.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at

352.
351-52.
352.
352-53.

89. 973 S.W.2d 453 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1998, no pet.).

90. Id. at 455.
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legal services performed by Valero's in-house counsel for the joint
venture.
The Texas Rules of Evidence provide there is no attorney/client privilege "[a]s to a communication relevant to a matter of common interest
between or among two or more clients if the communication was made by
any of them to a lawyer retained or consulted in common, when offered
in an action between or among any of the clients." 9 1 The court of appeals
held that although Teco and Valero were joint venturers who owed certain fiduciary duties towards each other, they were not joint clients. The
court analogized the situation to the relationship between a trustee and
the trust's beneficiary. In Huie v. DeShazo,92 the Texas Supreme Court
held that a trust beneficiary could not discover the confidential communications between a trustee and the lawyer retained by that trustee. However, the trustee was under a "duty to disclose material facts[ ] or to
provide a full accounting to the beneficiary, even as to information conveyed to the trustee's attorney, so long as it did not reveal confidential
attorney-client communications. ' 93 Similarly, while joint venturers owe
each other fiduciary duties, they are entitled to seek confidential advice
from counsel concerning their duties as pipeline operators. 94 The fact
that Teco paid for part of the services rendered by Valero's in-house
counsel did not change the result: "The fact that Valero's attorneys rendered undefined legal services to the joint venture or that Teco paid for
some undisclosed portion of the joint venture's legal expenses, without
more, is insufficient to establish that Teco and Valero were joint
95
clients."
In Berger v. Lang,96 the Houston Court of Appeals had to decide
whether the rule affording blanket confidentiality to grievance proceedings could be waived. Rule 2.15 of the Texas Rules of Disciplinary Procedure provides, in relevant part, that "[a]ll information, proceedings,
hearing transcripts, statements, and any other information coming to the
attention of the investigatory panel of the Committee must remain confidential and may not be disclosed to any person or entity (except the Chief
Disciplinary Counsel) unless disclosure is ordered by the court."'97 Despite the absolute nature of the wording of this rule, the court determined
that a party who made statements on the record during a trial concerning
a disciplinary proceeding "impliedly invites or consents" to being crossexamined on the subject. 98 In this case, Berger disclosed that a grievance
had been filed against him and implied a favorable outcome. On crossexamination, however, the trial court permitted Berger's opponent to ask
TEX. R. EVID. 503(d)(5).
922 S.W.2d 920, 924 (Tex. 1996).
Valero, 973 S.W.2d at 458-59 (citing Huie, 922 S.W.2d at 923).
See id. at 459.
Id.
976 S.W.2d 833 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1998, pet. denied).
97. Id. at 836 (citing TEX. DISCIPLINARY R. PROF'L CONDUCT 2.15, reprinted in TEX.
Gov'T CODE ANN., tit. 2, subtit. G app. A (Vernon Supp. 1998)).
98. Id. at 837.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
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him questions concerning the true outcome of the proceeding, finding
that Berger waived his right to confidentiality.99
The court of appeals held the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
allowing the examination. The court looked to Rule 511 of the Texas
Rules of Evidence, which provides that a privileged conferred under the
Evidence Rules is waivable. The court, however, did not explain how
Rule 511 applied to a privilege conferred by the Disciplinary Rules, but
instead relied on a Dallas Court of Appeals opinion, which held a party
could waive the statutory hospital committee privilege. 00
III.

MISCELLANEOUS DECISIONS OF NOTE

The last two decisions of note this year concern the admissibility of
prior bad acts and matters of which a court may take judicial notice.
In Stokes v. Puckett,10' three former employees of Dr. Stokes sued him
for assault and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Stokes had
made repeated sexual advances to the three women and numerous sexually suggestive comments. At trial, the court allowed deposition testimony of other former Stokes employees to be read to the jury. These
former employees also testified that Stokes had made sexual advances
towards them. Stokes' counsel objected on the grounds that the deposition testimony was inadmissible character evidence and that under Rule
403 its probative value was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, misleading the jury, or the needless
presentation of cumulative evidence. 10 2
On appeal, the court affirmed, holding the deposition testimony was
admissible under Rule 406 of the Texas Rules of Evidence. 10 3 Rule 406
provides:
Evidence of the habit of a person or of the routine practice of an
organization, whether corroborated or not and regardless of the
presence of eyewitnesses, is relevant to prove that the conduct of the
person or organization on a particular occasion was in conformity
with the habit or routine practice. 1°4
The court also overruled the Rule 403 objection and concluded that the
deposition testimony involved conduct by the "same supervisory personnel (Stokes), the same work place, and the same pattern of conduct. ' 10 5
Finally, the court found the testimony was admissible under Rule 404(b)
of the Texas Rules of Evidence to "show Stokes' motive, intent, plan, or
1 u °6
absence of mistake or accident.
99. See id. at 835.
100. See id. at 837 (citing Terrell State Hosp. v. Ashworth, 794 S.W.2d 937, 940 (Tex.
App.-Dallas 1990) (orig. proceeding)).
101. 972 S.W.2d 921 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1998, no pet. h.).
102. See id. at 926.
103. See id. at 926-27.
104. TEX. R. EVID. 406.
105. Stokes, 972 S.W.2d at 926-27.
106. Id. at 927.
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The court's decision in Allstate Insurance Co. v. Lincoln,107 serves as a
reminder of the importance of refuting the reasonableness of attorneys'
fees. In that case, the issue was whether there was sufficient evidence to
sustain an award of attorneys' fees for breach of contract when the party
seeking fees failed to offer any testimony that the fees sought were usual
and customary. Usual and customary fees are presumed reasonable.10 8
The Waco Court of Appeals held that the decision to grant or deny fees
was within the discretion of the court and that because the court heard
evidence of the amount of fees incurred, it was "entitled to take judicial
notice of the usual and customary fees."' 10 9
IV.

CONCLUSION

As has been the case in recent years, the significant developments in
evidentiary law have centered around expert testimony. Perhaps reflecting the increasing complexity of trial practice, these decisions teach that
the courts, especially Texas courts, are exercising an ever increasing gatekeeper role and that the unwary practitioner must pay careful attention
to the sufficiency and reliability of the expert's testimony.

107. 976 S.W.2d 873 (Tex. App.-Waco 1998, no pet. h.).
108. See id. at 877 (citing TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 38.003 (Vernon
1997)).
109. Id. (citing TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 38.004 (Vernon 1997)).

